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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) were an attempt to control excessive discovery. Faced with 
increasing amounts of discovery in some cases, especially electronically 
stored information (ESI), the rules now beg litigants and judges to do 
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I thank seminar participants at Emory
University School of Law and George Washington University Law School for helpful comments. 
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better. One of the main changes to discovery is the new language in Rule 
1 that makes it clear that the litigants, not just the judge, have the 
responsibility to behave in a way that leads to just, speedy, and 
inexpensive litigation.1 The other main discovery-related change is that 
Rule 26 now states explicitly that the amount of discovery should be 
“proportional to the needs of the case.”2 
These changes are meek and ineffectual. As to the changes in Rule 
1, before the change, it was already clear that securing the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of a case was the responsibility of both 
judge and litigant. Indeed, it is impossible to think of anyone else whose 
responsibility it might have been. As to the changes to Rule 26, since 
2000, Rule 26 already had made clear that proportionality was required.3 
All that the 2015 amendment did was to move the proportionality 
requirement to a different part of Rule 26, and make it even more explicit. 
These changes have done little to control excess discovery. As we will 
see, excessive discovery is a deep, fundamental flaw. The 2015 
amendments are utterly insufficient to cure it. They are like placing a band 
aid on the arm of a person with lung cancer; they will do nothing to cure 
the illness. 
Broad discovery harms the litigation process like a cancer.4 The 
discovery provisions in the 1938 FRCP, and thereafter in most states’ 
procedural codes, were a grand experiment. But the last seven decades 
have shown that, even by the FRCP’s own standards, they are a failure. 
They have not led to the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action,” as Rule 1 promised.5 Instead, discovery is avoided in most 
cases and ruins many of the rest. Most litigants choose to make their cases 
discovery-free, finding the process unnecessary, unhelpful, and even 
harmful. 
In contrast, broad discovery has transformed the most important 
cases: those with the most at stake, addressing society’s most crucial 
issues and involving the best, highest-paid lawyers. These cases now last 
1. Rule 1 now provides that “[t]hese rules . . . should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
3. The earlier version of the rules prohibited discovery if “the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,” requiring that discovery be proportional, but not 
using that word. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014). 
4. Much commentary in this Article is based on the author’s earlier work in George B.
Shepherd, Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why Broad Pretrial Discovery Should Be Further 
Eliminated, 49 IND. L. REV. 465 (2016). 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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longer and cost more to litigate. They settle less, requiring more trials and 
consuming more judicial resources.6 
And the harms that discovery causes have become more acute as 
discovery of ESI has become more important. For example, with a single 
document request, a litigant can force an adversary to produce millions of 
pages of the adversary’s electronically-stored private information.7 
There is no reason to conclude that all of this time and expense leads 
to more justice. Discovery is a powerful weapon for imposing expense 
and difficulty on an adversary. Plaintiffs and defendants with frivolous 
cases often use discovery, or the threat of it, to coerce settlements. 
Defendants escape liability by imposing oppressive, intrusive discovery 
requests. 
The discovery process has made many lawyers wealthy. Because 
cases last longer and settle less, more lawyers are needed. Each additional 
dollar of cost that discovery imposes on litigants is another dollar for a 
lawyer. 
However, broad discovery has otherwise deeply harmed the practice 
of law. Elite lawyers now devote themselves almost completely to 
discovery and other motions based upon it, such as summary judgment 
motions. This work, although lucrative, is often boring drudgery. 
Moreover, the use of broad discovery caused the profession to switch from 
fixed-fee billing to hourly billing.8 As this author has explored elsewhere, 
the switch has harmed the legal profession deeply. 
Discovery is against human nature, and it violates norms of privacy. 
People in the United States expect privacy, especially from their 
government. Indeed, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution have been interpreted as creating certain rights to privacy. 
The government may not intrude into a citizen’s private decisions about 
contraception, abortion, or homosexual sex.9 And yet the FRCP permit a 
government agency—the courts—and a government official—the 
judge—to intrude into a citizen’s most private matters merely because the 
citizen has sued or been sued. 
6. See infra Section II(F)(1).
7. Martha J. Dawson & Bree Kelly, The Next Generation: Upgrading Proportionality for a
New Paradigm, DEF. COUNS. J. 434, 437-38 (2015) (noting that Microsoft reports the average amount 
of pages of discovery documents involved in the average case was more than 59 million). 
8. See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91 (1999). 
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which all interpret the 14th Amendment to create a right to 
privacy surrounding these activities. 
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Because broad discovery is against human nature, litigants who 
receive discovery requests resist them compulsively. This leads to endless 
cycles of evasions and motions to compel. Broad discovery is like 
prohibition. Citizens tend to like both privacy and alcohol. Any attempt to 
intrude on either privacy or drinking leads to resistance and unhappiness. 
Because it violated ingrained human preferences, prohibition was a 
failure. For similar reasons, so too is broad discovery. 
Broad discovery should be eliminated. It is a failure and has been so 
ever since it began in 1938. The rest of the world recognizes this; no other 
country has copied the United States’ approach.10 Moreover, almost from 
the start, discovery’s flaws have been recognized, with bar committees, 
scholars, and courts pointing out discovery’s harmful effects and 
proposing changes.11 Some of the most recent criticism of discovery came 
from the Supreme Court through its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly12 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.13 Likewise, the 2015 FRCP amendments 
made further adjustments. However, they achieved little improvement. 
Although the diagnosis has been correct, the modest treatments that 
have been continually implemented have achieved little. The correct cure 
is simple. Broad discovery is a disease that should be eliminated 
completely. 
Both the legal profession and society at large would be better off 
without broad discovery. The cost of litigation would decline 
substantially. Cases would settle more frequently and quicker. Parties 
would no longer be able to use discovery as a weapon to achieve unfair 
results. Fewer frivolous suits would result in lucrative settlements. 
Corporate defendants would no longer be able to stonewall by asserting 
large, intrusive discovery requests. 
Although many lawyers might lose their jobs as litigation becomes 
quicker and easier, the displaced lawyers would be free to pursue careers 
that contribute more to society’s well-being. 
10. See Karin Retzer & Michael Miller, Mind the Gap: U.S. Discovery Demands versus EU
Data Protection, Privacy & Security Law Report, 10 PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. 886 (2011), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110601-US-Discovery-Demands-versus-EU-Data-
Protection.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8D8-H54E] (noting Europe, in particular, takes a skeptical view of 
the U.S. discovery process, as a direct challenge to individual privacy; the European Union adopted 
the European Privacy Directive and several European states adopted “blocking statutes” with the 
specific goal of limiting the reach of discovery requests from U.S. courts). 
11. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989); Gordon 
W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather than the 
Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513 (2010). 
12. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
13. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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The elimination of broad discovery is not a risky, fringe proposal. 
Instead, the current U.S. system is the extreme outlier. Eliminating broad 
discovery would return the United States to the mainstream with almost 
every other country. As in other countries, discovery should be strictly 
limited and allowed only in exceptional circumstances.14 
The Supreme Court has recently expressed similar concerns about 
the discovery process and, even more importantly, has eliminated 
discovery in some cases.15 The decisions in Twombly and Iqbal nominally 
addressed issues of pleading.16 However, like the analysis in this Article, 
their focus was on the harms of the discovery process.17 Moreover, just as 
this Article proposes, the decisions eliminate discovery in some cases; the 
decisions require early dismissal of certain cases that might otherwise lead 
to broad discovery. 
The proposal in this Article safely builds on the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions by proposing elimination of broad discovery in all cases, rather 
than just some. The decisions moved in the right direction, but did not go 
far enough. Instead, broad discovery should be eliminated completely. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the history of 
discovery and its many harmful impacts. Section II also discusses 
attempts over many decades to fix the system by tinkering with the 
discovery rules, as well as making changes judicially, as in Twombly and 
Iqbal, and in the 2015 FRCP amendments. Section III describes how 
eliminating broad discovery would provide many benefits and little harm. 
II. AN EXPERIMENT FAILS FROM THE BEGINNING
The discovery provisions of the FRCP created a new experimental 
system that had not been tried anywhere else. The new discovery rules 
transformed the practice of law. However, almost immediately, critics 
began to note the system’s basic flaws. A wide array of fixes have been 
proposed and adopted.18 However, these fixes have not worked. 
Discovery still imposes many harms. 
14. See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-
First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 764 (2003). 
15. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
16. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
17. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
18. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 11; Netzorg & Kern, supra note 11. 
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A New System 
The drafters of the discovery provisions of the FRCP knew that their 
new system was revolutionary and unprecedented.19 Although some state 
courts offered isolated discovery opportunities, no state combined them 
together as did the FRCP. Moreover, many of the state provisions that did 
exist could not take effect because courts held that federal provisions with 
no discovery occupied the field, precluding application of the state 
provisions.20 
The new federal discovery rules were a complete list of all discovery 
devices that were available in any state and in Great Britain.21 The 
methods now include: required initial disclosures,22 depositions by oral 
examination,23 depositions by written questions,24 interrogatories,25 
production of documents and things,26 medical examinations,27 and 
requests for admission.28 
The approach was revolutionary not only because of the number of 
discovery devices that were now available, but also because of how easily 
the devices could be invoked. At the same time, the rules that permitted 
the discovery devices also permitted what is called “notice pleading.”29 A 
plaintiff could file a complaint, survive a motion to dismiss, and be 
permitted to use the discovery devices by providing a complaint that 
offered merely “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”30 Later courts interpreted this to mean that 
the complaint could include only the simplest conclusory summary of the 
plaintiff’s differences with the defendants, and needed to include few, if 
any, facts.31 Accordingly, a plaintiff can commence a case with few, or 
19. See Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century:
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 158-59 (1999) (noting that the new 
discovery provisions were genuinely unprecedented); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions 
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 734, 
736 (1998) (describing the 1938 “discovery revolution”). 
20. Marcus, supra note 19, at 159; Subrin, supra note 19, at 698-701. 
21. Marcus, supra note 19, at 159; Subrin, supra note 19, at 718-19. 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 30. 
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 31. 
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 35. 
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 36. 
29. Pleading, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A system of defining and
narrowing the issues in a lawsuit whereby the parties file formal documents alleging their respective 
positions.”).  
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
31. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
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no, facts in hand and instead attempt to gather facts during the discovery 
process. 
The framers knew that their approach was unprecedented.32 
Moreover, they knew that such broad discovery created dangerous risks 
of abuse.33 However, as the chief reporter for the FRCP, Charles Clark, 
later noted, the chairman of the Advisory Committee on these provisions, 
Edson Sunderland, “had developed both the enthusiasm and the drive of 
a crusader” to have the discovery provisions adopted.34 Indeed, 
Sunderland had for years argued in print that broad discovery should be 
permitted.35 Accordingly, in public hearings on the provisions, the 
committee did not focus on the provisions’ revolutionary nature, instead 
suggesting that the changes were merely incremental.36 
Later courts recognized the new rules’ revolutionary nature. For 
example, in the famous Hickman v. Taylor case, the Third Circuit noted 
in 1945 that “[t]he rules probably go further than any State practice.”37 
Similarly, the FRCP’s chief reporter noted, in 1959: “The system thus 
envisaged . . . had no counterpart at the time [Edson Sunderland] 
proposed it.”38 
B. The New Discovery Rules and the Transformation of Litigation 
Before 1938, federal courts denounced any attempt to require 
disclosure of the adversary’s case or evidence as improper “fishing 
expeditions.”39 By 1946, the new FRCP’s discovery rules had converted 
these attitudes completely. In the appeal of Hickman v. Taylor, the 
Supreme Court stated: “No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing 
expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts 
underlying his or her opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”40 
The new provisions for wide-open discovery created both 
opportunities and incentives. First, the new rules greatly expanded 
32. Marcus, supra note 19, at 160; Subrin, supra note 19, at 734, 736. 
33. Marcus, supra note 19, at 160; Subrin, supra note 19, at 719. 
34. Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. 
L. REV. 6, 9 (1959). 
35. See generally Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE
L.J. 863 (1933). 
36. Marcus, supra note 19, at 160; Subrin, supra note 19, at 725-26. 
37. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 1945), aff’d, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
38. Clark, supra note 34, at 11. 
39. See Carpenter v. Winn, 331 U.S. 533, 540 (1911). 
40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
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litigants’ opportunities to obtain information from their adversaries.41 
Second, the new rules created an incentive for lawyers to use discovery, 
not only to obtain useful information, but also to gain tactical advantage 
by imposing large discovery costs on their adversaries. Conducting 
discovery became expensive, both for the party who sought discovery and 
for the party who responded to the discovery request.42 
As lawyers exploited the new opportunities for broad discovery, the 
discovery process transformed the practice of law.43 Maurice Rosenberg, 
one of the leading experts on the FRCP and litigation procedure, has noted 
that “[n]o change in litigation practice resulting from the Rules has had as 
great an impact as the liberalization of pretrial discovery.”44 Although 
some cases had little discovery, in a substantial fraction of cases, the use 
of discovery quickly exploded and, as Rosenberg has noted, discovery 
“expanded from a useful tool to a combination lawyer’s industry and 
litigator’s religion.”45 Before 1938, lawyers who conducted lawsuits were 
called “trial lawyers.” After the growth of discovery shifted the focus from 
trial to expanded pretrial proceedings, trial lawyers began to be called 
“litigators.”46 For most, “trial lawyer” was no longer an accurate title. 
Even in the small minority of cases in which trials occurred,47 the trials 
were now often preceded by long periods of intense pretrial 
maneuvering.48 
Broad discovery’s impact on the profession grew greater as state 
after state began to copy the new federal system,49 and as lawyers 
gradually began to adjust their professional behavior to the new discovery 
environment.50 Even after a jurisdiction adopted wide-open discovery, it 
could take years for lawyers to learn to exploit fully the opportunities that 
discovery offered both to obtain information and to seek strategic 
advantage. 
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
42. See George B. Shepherd, A Theoretical Model of the Pretrial Litigation Process and
Discovery (Sept. 16, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
43. See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing
Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197 (1989). 
44. Id. at 2203. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 97-98 
(Russell Sage Found. 1968). 
48. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2203-04. 
49. See Shepherd, supra note 4, at 469. 
50. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—’Much 
Ado About Nothing?,’ 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 695-96 (1995). 
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C. Continual Tinkering with a Flawed System 
Almost immediately after 1938, lawyers and commentators began to 
note the new system’s flaws.51 Initially, the focus was on how broad 
discovery in federal and state litigation caused litigation costs to grow 
quickly.52 Discovery costs soon began to consume more than one-third of 
the average case’s litigation costs.53 In the decade after 1938, testimony 
before Congress and a cascade of articles criticized the new discovery 
rules.54 
Among other concerns, a frequent complaint was discovery’s great 
expense.55 For example, in 1951, an official for the federal courts wrote: 
Today, after thirteen years of experience under liberal discovery rules, 
complaints are heard. It is said: (1) That discovery is expensive and time 
consuming out of proportion to benefits; that depositions last weeks, 
interrogatories and admissions cover thousands of items, and motions to 
produce call for tons of documents.56 
Similarly, the report from an extensive 1954 investigation concluded: 
[T]he average practitioner, in addition to being saddled with such 
overhead expenses as rising costs of office rents and clerical help, must 
cope with increased court costs, filing fees and lengthy pre-trial 
examinations . . . which are generally required in all negligence actions, 
regardless of the nature of the injury or the amount of the probable 
recovery.57 
Cost increases that resulted from wide-open discovery were not 
limited to increases in pretrial costs. In addition, discovery both reduced 
51. For a list of some of the early articles that criticized discovery, see William H. Speck, The 
Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1133 n.3 (1951). 
52. See id. at 1132.
53. See GLASER, supra note 47, at 179. 
54. See Speck, supra note 51, at 1133 n.3.
55. Id. at 1132. 
56. Id. Another survey described lawyers’ common complaints about discovery, one of which 
was, “[l]itigation is more expensive and takes more time than formerly, because of the great amount 
of work and documentation introduced by discovery.” GLASER, supra note 47, at 36.  
57. Louis P. Contiguglia & Cornelius E. Sorapure, Jr., Lawyer’s Tightrope—Use and Abuse of 
Fees, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 683, 701 (1956). Likewise, a 1957 article in the ABA Journal on the new 
pretrial discovery rules noted: 
Even though the Rules specifically provide protective measures against abuse, 
embarrassment and undue annoyance, nevertheless not only our own observations but the 
reported cases demonstrate the terrific time, expense and effort which can be, and are to a 
significant extent, the results of the procedure outlined in these Rules. 
Clyde A. Armstrong, The Use of Pretrial and Discovery Rules: Expedition and Economy in Federal 
Civil Cases, 43 AM. B. ASS’N J. 693, 694 (1957). 
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the frequency of settlement and caused trial costs other than discovery to 
increase.58 The drafters of the FRCP had predicted that, although 
discovery would impose some additional cost before trial, total costs 
would decline because discovery would cause more cases to settle.59 
The prediction was wrong. Both earlier and recent studies 
demonstrate that discovery did not produce a higher proportion of 
settlements than would occur without discovery.60 Instead, at the same 
time that discovery increased pretrial costs, it decreased the settlement 
rate, caused trials to become longer, and failed to reduce surprise at trial.61 
Scholars have developed various theories about why discovery deters 
settlement, including the explanation that discovery appears to create 
more disagreements than it resolves.62 Moreover, it appears that once 
litigants have spent large amounts on discovery, litigants have 
psychological difficulty in letting go and settling, even when it is in their 
financial interest to do so.63 
Whatever the reasons, the bar recognized that discovery caused total 
litigation costs to increase.64 The following conclusion from a 1951 
American Bar Association (ABA) survey was typical: 
Discovery does not appear to have been successful in speeding the 
disposition of cases, for instead the courts seem to have taken over a 
larger share of the burden of investigation. A comparison between cases 
with and without discovery in Chicago and Maryland disclosed that 
discovery is associated both with the cases which take longer to dispose 
of and with cases which more often go to trial.65 
58. See GLASER, supra note 47 at 97-98, 101, 107; see also Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2204; 
Speck, supra note 51, at 1152, 1155; Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Fed. Pretrial Discovery, 
45 F.R.D. 479, 489 (1968). For a review of various empirical studies, see Sorenson, supra note 50, at 
706-10 (1995). 
59. See GLASER, supra note 47 at 9-12; Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2204-05. 
60. See sources cited supra note 58. 
61. See sources cited supra note 58. 
62. A survey of discovery practice concluded: “Discovery gives the attacking party more
confidence in raising his price for a settlement, but this often has the unintended effect of carrying the 
case closer to trial.” GLASER, supra note 47, at 97. Glaser concluded that discovery leads to new 
disagreements between the litigants, rather than resolving disagreements. See id. at 91-101; see also 
generally Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 2204 (arguing discovery raises more new factual issues than 
it resolves); Shepherd, supra note 42 (noting the discovery rules establish incentives that induce a 
litigation arms race and deter settlement). 
63. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory
Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 753 (1995) (recognizing discovery increases pretrial expenses and 
psychological studies indicate that people decline to settle after they have incurred great expense). 
64. See Speck, supra note 51, at 1154-55.
65. Id. at 1155.
10
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Likewise, a lawyer from Indiana compared practice in federal court 
with practice in state court, where discovery was prohibited, and noted, 
“[o]ur office files for federal cases are from two to three times as thick as 
those for comparable cases in state courts . . . .”66 Addressing the 
problems “of the tremendous expense, effort and time which can be 
required of parties involved in litigation,” a law firm partner from 
Pittsburgh wrote in the ABA Journal in 1957 that “it seems clearly evident 
that in many respects the procedure provided for in the Rules has 
aggravated rather than alleviated them.”67 A decade later, a survey 
indicated that discovery costs made up 19%-36% of litigation costs.68 
The new wide-open discovery substantially increased costs in 
another way: by increasing uncertainty.69 After broad discovery was 
introduced, a lawyer was much less certain about the time and expense 
that a case would require to litigate.70 Such uncertainty is a real cost. 
Indeed, the insurance industry is based on people’s willingness to pay to 
eliminate such risk. 
Although discovery caused litigation costs to increase greatly in 
some cases, it caused little increase in others.71 Large average discovery 
costs hid wide variation in discovery costs in individual cases.72 A survey 
in 1951 noted many complaints “[t]hat discovery is expensive and time 
consuming.”73 However, the survey also noted the wide variation in 
discovery amounts. Some cases had voluminous discovery, but some had 
little.74 Indeed, both this 1951 survey and another survey from the same 
year noted that no discovery occurred in more than half of the cases 
filed.75 Likewise, a survey of discovery costs in the early 1960s showed 
that average discovery expenses were substantial.76 However, the 
variation among individual cases was broad. Again, some cases had no 
discovery, in others it was moderate, and in some it was substantial.77 A 
decade later, surveys continued to show that no discovery occurred in 
66. GLASER, supra note 47, at 162. 
67. Armstrong, supra note 57, at 695. 
68. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 780 (2010).  
69. See generally George B. Shepherd, An Empirical Study of the Economics of Pretrial
Discovery, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 245, 253-55 (1999). 
70. See generally id. 
71. See Speck, supra note 51, at 1150. 
72. See id. 
73. Id. at 1132. 
74. See id. at 1150. 
75. See id. at 1134; The Practical Operation of Fed. Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 133 (1952). 
76. See GLASER, supra note 47, at 179. 
77. See id. at 164-66. 
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more than half of cases, and that in cases with discovery, the amount of 
discovery varied widely.78 
What followed over the coming years was continued dissatisfaction 
with the discovery process interspersed approximately once per decade 
with modest reform attempts.79 Dissatisfaction in the late 1950s and early 
1960s led to funding of a large study of discovery practices in the mid-
1960s.80 This in turn led to modest amendments in 1970.81 
After another decade of continued dissatisfaction, additional 
amendments occurred in 1980 and 1983.82 The new changes required 
additional judicial supervision of discovery.83 A discovery conference 
was now required, signing of discovery requests now certified that such 
requests were necessary, and judges were to impose time limits for 
discovery and stop discovery that was disproportionate.84 
The changes helped little.85 Judges refused or were unable to both 
police discovery effectively and to make the disproportionality 
decisions.86 The decades since 1938 in which judges had been required to 
intervene little in discovery had created habits that were hard to break.87 
In addition, judges felt that they lacked sufficient information about cases 
to decide whether discovery requests were proportionate.88 Thus, as 
Richard Marcus noted, the changes “were something of a dud.”89 
After another decade of dissatisfaction, the federal discovery 
provisions received seemingly important new changes in 1993.90 There 
were numerical limits on depositions, moratoriums on discovery until the 
78. See PAUL R. CONNALLY ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL 
LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28-29 (1978), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
jcclpdis.pdf/$file/jcclpdis.pdf [http://perma.cc/TWT8-Q33P]; see also Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing 
Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 REV. LITIG. 77, 87-88 n.19 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery 
in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded 
Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1434-35, 1441-42 (1994). 
79. See GLASER, supra note 47, at 26-37. 
80. Id. 
81. Marcus, supra note 19, at 161. 
82. See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980);
Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). 
83. See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521;
Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165.  
84. See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521;
Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165. 
85. Marcus, supra note 19, at 162-63. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 163. 
90. Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993). 
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parties met and submitted a discovery plan to the judge, and most 
controversially, mandatory initial disclosures of relevant witnesses and 
documents.91 
After additional discontent, especially with mandatory initial 
disclosures, additional changes occurred in 2000.92 The rules limited 
mandatory disclosure to documents that supported a party’s claims or 
defenses.93 In addition, the changes narrowed the scope of discovery 
modestly.94 
Despite discovery causing lawyers continual irritation, it produced 
one great benefit for the profession. Discovery has eventually led to 
increases in lawyers’ incomes and the hiring of more lawyers; which 
occurred once discovery caused the profession to switch to hourly billing 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The combination of discovery and 
hourly billing was a bonanza for lawyers.95 
Some additional changes then occurred, first by the Supreme Court’s 
judicial intervention, and then by amendments to the FRCP in 2015. 
D. The Supreme Court Eliminates Discovery in Many Cases 
In two decisions from 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the decades of tinkering with the rules had not worked.96 Despite all 
of the rule changes, discovery abuse was still pervasive. So, the Supreme 
Court effectively eliminated discovery in many cases.97 It did so not by 
changing the discovery rules, but by changing the pleading rules to make 
it much more difficult for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.98 For these cases, the decisions effectively 
eliminated discovery.99 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme 
Court abandoned the notice-pleading standard that had existed for more 
than half a century.100 The notice-pleading standard was one of the two 
columns that supported the system for broad discovery; in many cases, 
91. Marcus, supra note 19, at 163-64. 
92. Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340 (2000). 
93. Id. 
94. Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 75, 80-82 (2000). 
95. See Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8. 
96. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007). 
97. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
98. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
99. See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
100.  See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
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discovery was broad only because the combination of notice pleading and 
the discovery rules permitted discovery. 
Notice pleading and the discovery rules would combine to produce 
broad discovery in two steps. First, notice pleading would permit a 
complaint to survive until the discovery process began.101 Until the two 
decisions, a plaintiff was permitted to file a complaint that provided the 
defendant with nothing but minimal notice about the nature of the 
plaintiff’s claims against the defendant.102 A complaint with few, or no, 
facts would usually survive a motion to dismiss. 
Second, when the motion to dismiss had been surmounted, the 
plaintiff could move on to conduct discovery.103 The broad discovery 
rules would then become important, permitting the plaintiff to obtain 
broad categories of information, including, perhaps, the facts that were 
necessary to support the allegations in the complaint. 
In sum, before the decisions, the combination of notice pleading and 
the discovery rules meant that a plaintiff whose complaint contained few 
facts could conduct discovery. Indeed, the system permitted plaintiffs to 
use discovery to find the facts to support the complaint. As the Court noted 
in Hickman v. Taylor in 1947, the new system that the FRCP created was 
designed to permit a plaintiff to file a conclusory complaint now, and then 
find the facts to support the complaint later in discovery.104 The Court 
stated, “[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve 
to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s 
case.”105 The combination of notice pleading and the discovery rules 
opened the discovery floodgates. 
Twombly and Iqbal have now, in many instances, closed these 
floodgates, eliminating discovery in some cases. No longer are fishing 
expeditions allowed. The plaintiff must now have facts in hand at the time 
of filing the complaint. The plaintiff may no longer file the complaint first 
and then use the discovery process to find facts later. 
In the two decisions, the Court made it much more difficult for a 
plaintiff’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss and therefore much 
more difficult for a plaintiff to be able to proceed far enough in the case 
to be permitted to conduct discovery. That is, the decisions’ effect is to 
shut off many plaintiffs from access to the discovery process. The two 
101.  See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 
 102.  See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 
(2d Cir. 1944).  
103.  See generally Conley, 355 U.S. 41; Dioguardi, 139 F.2d 774.  
104.  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
105.  Id. 
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decisions have, in many cases, eliminated discovery just as effectively as 
would a revision to the FRCP that eliminated depositions, interrogatories, 
or requests for production. 
The facts of Twombly are simple. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants had conspired to violate antitrust laws.106 However, the 
plaintiff’s complaint lacked any direct evidence that the defendants had 
conspired together.107 Instead, the plaintiff hoped to acquire such evidence 
during the case’s discovery process.108 That is, the case would have been 
just the sort of “fishing expedition” that the Court in Hickman in 1947 had 
said was permitted under the system of notice pleading and broad 
discovery.109 
The Court’s analysis proceeded as follows. First, the Court 
recognized that earlier attempts, noted above, to control and reduce 
discovery had failed.110 For example, the Court wrote that increased 
judicial supervision of the discovery process was no solution stating: 
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to 
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process 
through “careful case management,” given the common lament that the 
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on 
the modest side.111 
Quoting at length from an article by a federal judge that indicated that 
better judicial case management could not reduce discovery abuse, the 
Court noted, “[g]iven the system that we have, the hope of effective 
judicial supervision is slim.”112 
Likewise, the Court indicated that discovery abuse could not be 
eliminated by either increased use of summary judgment or improved jury 
instructions:113 “It is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse 
cannot be solved by ‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary 
judgment stage,’ much less ‘lucid instructions to juries.’”114 
Instead, even with better case management, better summary 
judgment practice, and improved jury instructions, unscrupulous plaintiffs 
with frivolous cases could still extort large settlements by threatening to 
106.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. 
107.  Id. at 564. 
108.  Id. at 559. 
109.  Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. 
110.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. 
111.  Id. at 559. 
112.  See id. at 597 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 638-39). 
113.  Id. at 569-70. 
114.  Id. at 559. 
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impose discovery expense. The Court noted that, even with the new 
approaches to control discovery abuse, “the threat of discovery expense 
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before 
reaching those proceedings.”115 
The Court then reached its striking conclusion: to eliminate the 
possibility of discovery abuse, it was necessary to tighten the pleading 
standard—here for pleading conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.116 The Court indicated that “it is only by taking care to 
require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can 
hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with 
no ‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal 
relevant evidence’ to support a § 1 claim.”117 Cases that failed to achieve 
this pleading standard would be dismissed and prohibited from continuing 
on to the next stage where discovery was allowed.118 That is, a case would 
now be dismissed if a plaintiff’s only route to success was through a 
discovery fishing expedition. 
The later decision in Iqbal made clear that the new pleading standard 
applied generally and not just to antitrust cases.119 Although the opinions 
in Twombly and Iqbal did not purport to change interpretation of the 
specific discovery rulesRules 31 through 36 of the FRCPthey had the 
same impact in many cases as if the Court had revoked the rules. In many 
cases in which discovery would have been available before the decisions, 
discovery is now no longer available; the plaintiff’s complaint must now 
be dismissed before the case reaches the discovery phase. 
Twombly and Iqbal represent a fundamental rejection of the 
discovery system that the FRCP established in 1938 and that the Court 
had protected for seven decades. Concluding that the existing system 
created inefficiencies and abuse, and that other judicial and legislative 
attempts at cures had failed, the Court stopped merely tinkering. Instead, 
it eliminated discovery for many cases. The decisions represent a 
fundamental reduction in the number and type of cases in which discovery 
is available. 
The Court did exactly what this Article proposes, except the Court 
eliminated discovery for only some cases. The only difference between 
this Article’s proposal and the Court’s resolution of Twombly and Iqbal: 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. at 556.  
117.  Id. at 559 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). 
118.  See id. at 569-70. 
119.  See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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this Article suggests that reform should go further and eliminate broad 
discovery in all cases, not just in some of them. 
E. The Ineffectual 2015 Amendments 
In 2015, the FRCP were tinkered with some more. Recognizing that 
discovery was still often excessive and subject to abuse, the rules were 
amended in two main ways. First, Rule 1 was amended to make clear that 
both the judge and the litigants were responsible for ensuring that a case 
proceeded without abuse, including discovery abuse. Before, Rule 1 had 
read: “These rules . . . should be construed and administered to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”120 The 2015 amendments added a few words to make clear 
that the people who were required to do the construing and administering 
were the judge and litigants. Rule 1 now provides that “[t]hese rules . . . 
should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the 
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”121 
This amendment does little, if anything. Without the amendments, it 
was already clear that the people who were responsible for obtaining just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination were the judge and litigants. When 
the original formulation indicated that the rules “should be construed and 
administered” to require justice, speed, and efficiency, it was clear that 
this meant that the judge was to interpret the rules to foster these goals, 
and that the judge was to “administer” the rules so as to impose these 
requirements on the litigants. The task of “construing” is the judge’s. And 
the people to whom the judge “administers” are the litigants. 
The new words add nothing. Before the 2015 amendments, it was 
clear that the rules demanded that the judge require the parties to litigate 
so as to achieve justice, speed, and efficiency. After the amendments, the 
rules indicated exactly the same thing, except with added redundant 
language. 
The 2015 amendments’ second main alteration was to include in the 
specification of the scope of allowable discovery that any discovery be: 
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the 
issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
120.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2014). 
121.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
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benefit.122 
At first glance, this might seem to be a major new limit on the scope 
of discovery. However, that impression is incorrect. The preexisting 
version of the rules already contained almost all of this language, only in 
a different, less-central section. The rules prohibited discovery if “the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.”123  That is, even before 2015, the rules required 
proportionality—that cost did not outweigh benefit. The innovation of the 
2015 provision was to use the word “proportional.” However, even before 
2015, the proportionality requirement already existed, just without using 
the word “proportional.” 
Moreover, other than the phrase including “proportional,” the old 
wording was very similar to the new. The old wording was: 
[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise 
allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.124 
As can be seen, the new wording is very similar to the old wording above. 
The 2015 revisions placed this paragraph in a more central position, 
as part of the definition of the scope of discovery, rather than in a separate 
section. But this should make little difference to the limitations that the 
paragraph imposes. The paragraph imposes the same requirements, 
regardless of whether it is moved a half a page from its original position. 
The revisions, then, do little except add the word “proportional” to a 
preexisting paragraph that already implies a proportionality requirement, 
and then move the paragraph to a more central position in the definition 
of scope of discovery. The 2015 revision does not change the rules, but 
instead just moves them around. 
In most every situation, outcomes would be the same under the old 
version as under the new. For example, suppose that a lawsuit had modest 
stakes of $50,000, but a litigant was proposing to take ten depositions, 
which would cost each litigant $5,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses for 
each deposition. The depositions would be prohibited under the 2015 
122.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
123.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014). 
124.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014). 
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amendments, because the large expense of the depositions was not 
“proportional to the needs of the case.” 
But the depositions would also have been prohibited before 2015, 
because “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, [and] the amount in 
controversy.”125 
F. Continuing Major Harms 
Despite the continued tinkering at the system’s edges in the 2015 
amendments, and despite the changes from Twombly and Iqbal, the 
system’s fundamental structure remains intact. Just as before, litigants in 
many cases can demand large amounts of information from their 
adversaries and impose large costs. Discovery still imposes the harms 
about which lawyers and litigants began to complain immediately after 
1938. Indeed, changing technology, especially information that is now 
available in electronic form, has caused the harms to worsen.126 
There are two reasons why the system does not provoke complete 
outrage. First, lawyers often benefit from discovery because it increases 
their incomes, although at their clients’ expense. Second, the system has 
existed for so long that most have gotten used to it. Almost nobody is alive 
who remembers life in the United States without discovery. Familiarity 
has deadened almost everyone to its obvious flaws. 
The following are discovery’s impacts. They are mainly harmful. 
There are two main categories: effects on legal costs and outcomes and 
effects on legal culture and relationships. 
1. Broad Discovery’s Impacts on Legal Costs and Outcomes
Discovery has increased litigation costs. A large study by the Federal 
Judicial Center examined more than 1,000 cases in federal court in case 
categories that would tend to have at least some discovery.127 The results 
indicate that discovery consumes approximately half of all litigation 
expenditures for the median case.128 
125.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (2014). 
 126.  See generally Ryan J. Reaves, The Dangers of E-Discovery and the New Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 3 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 32 (2007). 
127.  See Thomas W. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice 
under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 528 (1998).  
128.  See id. at 531; see also Marcus, supra note 19, at 167. 
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In absolute terms, the amounts that discovery consumes are large.129 
The study indicated that discovery, in the median case, consumed 
approximately 3% of the stakes.130 That is, in a case with stakes of $10 
million, direct discovery expense would be more than $300,000. Other 
earlier studies have produced similar estimates as to both relative and 
absolute expenses for discovery.131 
These expenses did not include the costs to the client of disruption 
from discovery. For example, not included were the costs of company 
employees’ identifying responsive documents. Nor did they include the 
large costs of the disruption when officers, directors, and other employees 
must be prepared for and attend depositions. Even apart from the direct 
legal fees for discovery, the discovery process in substantial litigation can 
paralyze a company. Although discovery’s indirect costs are impossible 
to measure with accuracy, indirect costs may often exceed the direct costs 
for attorney’s fees. 
Such costs might be acceptable if they achieved anything beneficial. 
However, all of the expense and disruption appears to be 
counterproductive. For example, a major benefit that the drafters 
promised for the 1938 federal discovery provisions was that discovery 
would promote quick settlement.132 The rules would force each litigant to 
put his or her cards on the table.133 When the litigants could see the relative 
strengths of their position and their adversary’s position, cases would 
quickly settle.134 Indeed, the new discovery provisions would do much of 
the work in achieving the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action,” as the drafters promised in their new Rule 1.135 
The predictions have been wrong. As already mentioned, both earlier 
and recent studies indicate that rather than increasing the settlement rate, 
discovery has reduced it.136 
Because discovery makes the litigation process inefficient and 
consumes so much additional lawyer time, it has increased lawyers’ 
incomes and led to the hiring of many additional lawyers.137 But the high 
incomes for a large population of lawyers is at society’s expense. Incomes 
and employment would increase in the nuclear power industry, at least in 
129.  Willging et al., supra note 127, at 548-49. 
130.  See id. at 549; Marcus, supra note 19, at 167. 
131.  See generally GLASER, supra note 47. 
132.  See Marcus, supra note 19, at 170 n.97. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
136.  See sources cited supra note 57. 
137.  Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, at 135. 
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the short run, if the industry purposefully caused a meltdown. Indeed, 
higher incomes and employment for lawyers is one of discovery’s harms, 
not a benefit.138 That lawyers benefit from the waste that discovery causes 
does not change the fact of the waste. 
Moreover, even if one looks only at discovery’s impacts on the legal 
profession—as this Article does in the next section—rather than 
appropriately on its impact on society as a whole, the other harms that 
discovery causes more than overwhelm the possible financial benefit that 
discovery has provided to the profession. The profession, not just society 
as a whole, is worse off with discovery. 
Although discovery is expensive, disruptive, and decreases the 
settlement rate, it might nonetheless be worthwhile if it produced 
outcomes with more justice. Occasionally, discovery achieves this goal.139 
For example, plaintiffs in a products liability case may discover the 
smoking-gun document that establishes the defendant’s liability.140 For 
example in Grimshaw v. Ford, the plaintiff obtained discovery of an 
internal Ford document that indicated that the company had, in deciding 
not to install a cheap safety device, balanced the cost of the device against 
the value of the lives that might be saved.141 Likewise, in a U.S. 
Department of Justice antitrust suit against Microsoft, the government 
obtained many of Bill Gates’s and other executives’ internal emails in 
which they indicated their intention to squash the competition.142 
However, the discovery process often produces injustice instead. 
Eventually, plaintiffs started to win cases against tobacco companies in 
part because of internal company documents—although the documents 
were often obtained by leaks from employees rather than through the 
discovery process.143 However, a major tool that tobacco companies had 
successfully used for decades to fend off tobacco plaintiffs was 
discovery.144 The companies would bury tobacco plaintiffs in intrusive, 
expensive discovery requests about the plaintiffs’ personal history—such 
as inquiries into plaintiffs’ earlier use of illegal drugs—while at the same 
time resisting the plaintiffs’ discovery requests doggedly.145 
138.  Id. at 162. 
139.  See generally Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981). 
140.  See generally id.  
141.  Id. at 800. 
142.  Ellen Neuborne, Microsoft’s Teflon Bill, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 1998), 
www.businessweek.com/1998/48/b3606125.htm [http://perma.cc/B482-WKU6].  
143.  See generally Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 170 F.R.D. 481 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 144.  Milo Geyelin & Ann Davis, Tobacco: A Vast Trove of Tobacco Documents Opens Up—
Tobacco Foes Target Role of Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 1998), at B1.  
145.  Id. 
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Likewise, defendants in cases involving birth defects and illnesses 
from birth control devices and drugs used during pregnancy would 
intimidate plaintiffs with massive discovery requests.146 The requests 
would seek disclosure of plaintiffs’ sex histories and other embarrassing 
information.147 The broad scope of discovery would permit intrusion into 
these areas, even though the information that was sought was barely 
relevant. Intimidated and outspent in a litigation war of attrition, the 
plaintiffs would often abandon the cases or settle cheaply.148 
In many cases, discovery is not a weapon for justice, but for injustice. 
Indeed, studies show that litigants frequently use discovery not 
legitimately to obtain necessary information.149 Instead, they impose 
discovery requests strategically to impose costs.150 Some cases descend 
into discovery wars of attrition with each litigant attempting to use 
discovery requests to exhaust the adversary. 
No data exists on the relative sizes of the groups of cases where 
discovery promotes justice rather than deters it. This author’s own 
experience in litigation, augmented by discussions from many other 
experienced litigators, is that only rarely does discovery produce the 
smoking-gun document that makes a difference to a case’s outcome. 
Rarely does such a smoking gun exist. If it does exist, photocopy 
technology often causes it to exist not only in the defendant’s internal 
files, but also in external sources such as the files of lawyers, accountants, 
or disgruntled employees. In this way, that document would be available 
even without discovery. 
Discovery’s usual impact is to either achieve the same result as 
would have occurred without discovery with much more trouble and 
expense, or to distort the result away from justice with just as much 
trouble and expense. A litigation partner in the large law firm of 
Debevoise & Plimpton while discussing foreign legal systems without 
discovery noted: 
There may be a few smoking guns (more likely, water pistols) that are 
not unearthed, and perhaps even a few truly meritorious suits that do not 
succeed. But it is extremely doubtful that these few exceptions justify 
the overwhelming burdens and abuses wrought by our current system of 
 146.  MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD 
(Pantheon 1985). 
147.  Id. 
 148.  Information about defense tactics of defendants mentioned in these paragraphs comes, in 
part, from the personal experiences of the author. 
149.  See Shepherd, supra note 69, at 251. 
150.  Id. 
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pretrial practice and discovery.151 
Indeed, corporations and wealthy people may use the threat of 
discovery to intimidate potential litigants into refraining even from filing 
suit. For decades, many potential tobacco plaintiffs would not sue because 
they foresaw the discovery barrage that the tobacco companies and their 
legions of lawyers would throw at them if they did.152 Indeed, that was 
one of the tobacco industry’s main tactics: deter additional lawsuits by 
litigating each one that was filed in the most expensive, scorched-earth 
way possible.153 A main way of imposing the expense was through 
discovery.154 
Litigants make the decision whether to sue in the shadow of the 
discovery process. It is certain that many lawsuits with strong merits that 
would otherwise succeed are never filed because of the discovery process. 
Opportunities for litigants to impose costs and intimidate have 
further increased in the past two decades as discovery of electronic 
information has begun.155 A corporate defendant will fear a request for all 
of the company’s emails relating to a certain issue. The review of this 
mass of material for privilege and relevance would be expensive and time-
consuming. 
By increasing litigation’s costs and the uncertainty of these costs, 
wide-open discovery has restricted access to legal services for some of 
society’s most vulnerable groups. Both the increase in litigation costs and 
the increased uncertainty raises the effective price of litigating a case. 
Those with the least wealth are least able to pay the higher price. By 
increasing litigation’s costs, broad discovery effectively denies these 
vulnerable groups recourse to lawyers, the courts, and justice. 
Moreover, wide-open discovery increases litigation’s effective cost 
most for those who are risk averse and who are thus most sensitive to the 
risk from discovery.156 These tend to be small businesses and individuals 
with few assets, for whom the risk of an unexpectedly large legal bill is 
unbearable.157 In contrast, large corporations and wealthy individuals tend 
151.  Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, 77 AM. B. ASS’N J. 79, 81 (1991). 
 152.  See generally Christine Hatfield, The Privilege Doctrines—Are They Just Another 
Discovery Tool Utilized by the Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging Information?, 16 PACE L. 
REV. 525 (1996).  
153.  Id. at 558-60. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Lance Shapiro, E-Discovery: Bargaining Bytes for Settlement, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
887, 887-88 (2014).  
156.  See Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, at 103-04. 
157.  Id. 
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to be less risk averse.158 In this sense, wide-open discovery weighs the 
scales of justice against small businesses and poor individuals and in favor 
of large corporations and the wealthy.159 
This is true for both potential plaintiffs and defendants. Discovery’s 
expense and uncertainty prevented some plaintiffs from asserting valid 
claims. For example, a plaintiff who, before the introduction of wide-open 
discovery, might have sued his or her landlord for illegally failing to 
maintain his or her apartment now may be unable to afford to sue. Under 
hourly billing, the potential plaintiff expects even this small case to 
require a prohibitive number of expensive hours of attorney time, many 
for discovery. Moreover, although the case might settle quicker than 
expected, there is also a substantial possibility that litigation costs would 
explode and drain the plaintiff’s assets. Unable to bear discovery’s 
expense or risk, the potential plaintiff may not assert his or her rights. 
Similarly, the plaintiff is unable to obtain representation on a contingency 
or at an affordable fixed fee because discovery has increased both the 
expected cost and the cost uncertainty that attorneys must cover. So, 
plaintiff’s contingency lawyers refuse cases that, absent discovery, they 
would have accepted. Or if fixed-fee representation is available, its price 
is prohibitive. 
Conversely, the cost and uncertainty of broad discovery prevented 
some defendants from obtaining representation to defend against invalid 
claims. Some defendants may settle even invalid claims for substantial 
sums because the settlement sums are cheaper than the large new costs 
that discovery imposes. 
Defenders of the discovery process proclaim as a main argument in 
favor of the process that most cases have no discovery.160 That many 
litigants avoid the discovery process is not evidence that the process 
functions well. To the contrary, it supports the conclusion that the system 
functions poorly. If the discovery process was so wonderful, then half of 
the litigants would not, in effect, choose to opt out of it. Moreover, if 
discovery was eliminated, these litigants would not miss it at all; indeed, 
they have taken matters into their own hands and eliminated it in their own 
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
299, 308 (2002). For example, Stephen Subrin argued:  
What neither foreign commentators on American discovery nor homegrown conservative 
critics tend to mention is the extensive empirical research in our country demonstrating 
that in many American civil cases, often approaching fifty percent, there is no discovery, 
and in most of the remainder of the cases there is remarkably little.  
Id. 
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cases themselves. That most potential users of discovery avoid it may 
suggest that something about discovery is very wrong. 
Litigants’ decision not to use discovery can be explained in two 
ways, neither of which indicates that the discovery process functions well. 
First, some cases may have such small stakes or clear evidence that 
discovery is not worth its substantial time, expense, and disruption. This 
is not evidence that the discovery process works well. Instead, it shows 
that discovery is too expensive, time-consuming, and disruptive for most 
cases. 
Second, even if a litigant’s case has large stakes and important 
factual disputes, the litigant nonetheless may seek no discovery for fear 
that doing so will trigger the adversary to impose expensive discovery 
requests on the litigant. Empirical studies show an important influence on 
the amount of discovery that a litigant seeks is the amount his or her 
adversary seeks, regardless of the litigant’s real need for information.161 
A litigant may fear that conducting any discovery will induce the 
adversary to strike back in kind, triggering an expensive discovery war of 
attrition.162 Experienced lawyers and their clients have seen too many 
other cases in which discovery and its expense have spun out of control.163 
Like the United States and Soviet Union with their missiles pointed at 
each other during the Cold War, an equilibrium results in some cases in 
which neither party conducts discovery. 
This explanation again demonstrates a basic flaw in the discovery 
process: it can be used not only to obtain information, but also to impose 
costs and disruption on the adversary. The fact that in many cases these 
threats balance out to the point that both litigants are intimidated into 
conducting no discovery shows only that discovery creates a fear of 
mutual assured destruction, not that the discovery process is a good idea. 
Twombly and Iqbal have eliminated some of the harms from 
discovery.164 But they have not eliminated all of them. For example, 
suppose that a case survives to the discovery phase because the complaint 
offers sufficient facts to satisfy the new pleading standard. Both the 
plaintiff and defendant may then seek to gain advantage by conducting 
abusive discovery. Full elimination of discovery’s dangers can be 
achieved only by eliminating discovery completely. 
161.  See Shepherd, Empirical Study, supra note 69, at 251. 
162.  Id. 
163.  See, e.g., id. 
164.  See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007). 
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Moreover, the uneven prohibition of discovery that Twombly and 
Iqbal imposed is not ideal. The two cases eliminate potentially abusive 
discovery by plaintiffs in some cases, but not by defendants. It would be 
better to eliminate broad discovery for all parties evenhandedly. 
2. Discovery Harms Legal Culture and Relationships
Broad discovery not only increases expense and warps case 
outcomes, it also corrodes both the practice of law and relationships 
between lawyers and clients. 
First, the discovery process is intensely boring. It requires both the 
creation of mountains of paper and tedious attention to detail. It is not 
much of an overstatement to assert that it has ruined the practice of law. 
Before discovery came to dominate litigation, the day-to-day activity in 
litigation was much more fun.165 Regardless of their pay, trial lawyers, as 
they were called then, could enjoy their jobs.166 People who were not in it 
solely for the money would become lawyers.167 Many lawyers recall a 
golden era of litigation that ended, perhaps without coincidence, just as 
discovery became dominant.168 
Now, in contrast, discovery has made much of litigation so tedious 
that many litigators, as they are now called, conclude that the only reason 
to do it is for the high pay.169 In recent decades, lawyers’ pay at the top 
firms has increased at the same time that the lawyers in them have become 
more miserable.170 Associate turnover at the best firms has reached 
stunning levels, often 20% per year.171 A typical first-year associate is a 
smart idealist who has learned all about lawyers’ being statesmen in a 
noble profession.172 Often within a year, the associate is crushed into 
165.  See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 20-21 (1st ed. 1994). 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at 22-23. 
168.  See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS 32-36 (Univ. of 
Chi. Press 1991); GLENDON, supra note 165, at 17-39; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 
291-92 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR 5-6 (Carolina Acad. Press 
1996). Alternately, it might be that lawyers of any given era always tend to believe that the previous 
generation of lawyers was more moral. For example, during the 1930s—the supposed golden age—
many lawyers proclaimed vigorously that moral standards had fallen precipitously compared to the 
previous generation. See, e.g., George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? 
ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2117-19 (1998). 
169.  GLENDON, supra note 165, at 25-26.  
170.  GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 168, at 34-36.  
171.  See Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, What Drives Turnover and Layoffs at Large Law Firms?, 
GEO. U. (2010), www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/documents/
upload/Conference-Papers-March-23-oyerlayoffs.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7WD-6ZFV]. 
172.  GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 168, at 36. 
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disillusioned depression by the tedious, wasteful reality of big-firm 
discovery practice.173 Contributing to the demoralization is the growing 
understanding that much of the discovery contributes little to justice and 
is used to intimidate adversaries or pad legal bills. 
The associate may look longingly at friends who work in practices 
that include little discovery, such as criminal prosecution or criminal 
defense, smaller-scale litigation with individual clients, or other work for 
state and local government. 
Second, broad discovery injures the relationship between lawyer and 
client. So-called “principal-agent conflicts” exist and create opportunities 
for abuse when an agent who has authority to make decisions on a 
principal’s behalf has different incentives than the principal. For example, 
much waste may exist in the medical profession because doctors often 
have broad discretion to decide what procedures and medications to use, 
but insurance companies pay for them. 
The discovery process has worsened the principal-agent conflict 
between lawyers and clients substantially because it provides lawyers 
with broad new discretion to spend large amounts of their clients’ money. 
Before 1938, there was little that a dishonest trial lawyer could do to pad 
her bills.174 The tasks in a case were relatively set and straightforward.175 
Moreover, litigators were generally paid fixed fees rather than billing by 
the hour.176 
However, broad discovery’s introduction gave lawyers broad new 
opportunities for exploiting their clients. As lawyers began to be paid by 
the hour, an unscrupulous lawyer could conduct excessive discovery to 
increase his or her income. A client would have little choice but to accept 
the lawyer’s decision about the appropriate discovery level, even though 
the client would know that his or her attorney had an incentive and 
opportunity to cheat. Some attorneys undoubtedly did cheat; some could 
not resist an open cookie jar. 
The result was a new mistrust of lawyers.177 The rise of broad 
discovery occurred at the same time that both the supposed golden age for 
lawyers ended and public perceptions of lawyers declined.178 Indeed, 
lawyers now rank near the bottom of polls on the public’s perceptions of 
173.  See id.   
174.  See ROSS, supra note 168, at 14-25.  
175.  Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, 120-26.  
176.  Id. 
177.  See Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP (Dec. 2014), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1654/Honesty-Ethics-Professions.aspx?version=print [http://perma.cc/26FP-RFL6]. 
178.  Id. 
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ethical behavior, along with insurance salesmen and car salesmen.179 In 
all of these professions, customers must rely on expert professionals for 
information in situations in which the expert’s interests conflict with the 
interests of the individual. Perhaps absent discovery, lawyers would be 
perceived more like members of professions for which the public has 
greater trust.180 
Third, broad discovery rots relationships among lawyers. Because 
the amount of discovery to conduct is within each opposing litigant’s 
discretion, a danger exists in every case that the adversary will perceive 
any discovery request from a litigant as too much.181 If the adversary is 
paying his or her attorney on a contingency, then the expense of 
responding to the discovery request comes straight out of the attorney’s 
wallet. It is no surprise that surveys show that, in high proportions of 
cases, at least one litigant believes the adversary is conducting excessive 
discovery.182 
Moreover, in addition to creating the possibility of incorrect 
perceptions of discovery excess, the discovery process creates new 
opportunities for unscrupulous lawyers actually to oppress their 
colleagues and gain unfair advantage.183 The introduction of discovery 
into litigation is like the introduction of the machine gun onto the 
battlefield. In the wrong hands, the new weapon creates many new 
opportunities for litigation mayhem and destruction. 
The hurt and mistrust among lawyers that the discovery process 
creates infects their relationships outside the courtroom. Lawyers now 
view themselves less as part of a cohesive, proud profession and more as 
lone gladiators, mistrustful of the knife in the back from a colleague.184 
G. Discovery is Inconsistent with the Adversary System 
The discovery process can function fairly and efficiently only if the 
litigants cooperate with each other. They must not seek to gain unfair 
advantage by seeking excessive discovery, or by resisting valid discovery 
inappropriately. 
But it is so tempting to seek large amounts of discovery. By doing 
so, they hope to gain advantage by imposing costs on their adversaries. It 
is so tempting to seek five depositions when one would do. It is so 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  See, e.g., Changes Ahead in Fed. Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 489 (1968). 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id.  
184.  See GLENDON, supra note 165, at 36-38.  
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tempting to propound large numbers of interrogatories when a small 
number would be sufficient. It is so tempting to seek large amounts of 
documents when there is really only need for a few. 
The excessive discovery may not only help the lawyer’s client by 
imposing costs on the adversary. In addition, the excessive discovery 
helps the lawyer; a lawyer who is paid by the hour can bill more hours by 
conducting more discovery. 
Likewise, it is tempting for a litigant to resist all of the adversary’s 
attempts to obtain discovery, even the adversary’s discovery attempts that 
are appropriate and valid. The litigant may seek a protective order even 
against an appropriate deposition. The litigant may assert shaky claims of 
privilege and work product against appropriate interrogatories. Faced with 
valid requests for production, the litigant may refuse to produce 
responsive documents, asserting weak claims of work product. 
As with seeking excessive discovery, the excessive resistance to the 
adversary’s discovery helps both the client and lawyer. The client benefits 
because the excessive resistance imposes costs on the adversary, 
intimidating the adversary in a discovery war of attrition. The resistance 
also benefits the lawyer, because the resistance allows the lawyer to bill 
more hours, dream up creative claims of privilege and work product, and 
draft motions for protective orders. 
These incentives for litigation excess are not unique to the discovery 
process. A quick look at the docket sheet for any case with large stakes 
shows many litigation events with dubious support. For example, any 
experienced lawyer knows that a plaintiff’s lawyer will routinely file not 
only strong claims, but also accompanying claims that are weak. 
Likewise, defense lawyers will file weak motions to dismiss and 
summary judgment motions. Indeed, at the law firm where I began 
practice, junior associates were initially all given a securities claim to 
defend. The supervising senior attorney instructed us all immediately to 
file a large discovery request, a motion to dismiss, and a summary 
judgment motion. This was the advice for every one of these securities 
claims, regardless of the stakes, and regardless of the merits of an 
individual case. The supervising attorney indicated that these three 
devices would intimidate the plaintiff, and show the plaintiff that we 
would be tough. 
But the level of expense that a litigant can impose through excess 
discovery activity is much greater than can be imposed through weak 
claims or through meritless motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. 
A meritless motion to dismiss or for summary judgment might take a few 
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weeks of attorney time to fend off. In contrast, excessive discovery can 
consume years. 
The courts deal with both weak claims by plaintiffs and weak 
motions to dismiss and weak summary judgment motions within the 
adversary system. Through decisions such as Twombly and Iqbal, judges 
are trained to dismiss weak claims quickly and efficiently. Celotex is 
another decision that helps judges dismiss certain claims quickly; a 
plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed on summary judgment unless the 
plaintiff has facts to support it.185 Likewise, appellate decisions teach 
judges how to deal quickly and efficiently with both weak motions to 
dismiss and weak summary judgment motions. Examples of such 
doctrines in summary judgment are those that instruct the judge to assume 
that the jury will believe the witnesses of the nonmoving party.186 
But in dealing with weak claims and weak motions to dismiss and 
for summary judgment, the system does not, in practice, require litigants 
to abandon our litigation system’s adversarial nature. Plaintiffs routinely 
file weak claims, and judges just as routinely dismiss them. Defendants 
routinely file weak motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Judges 
routinely dismiss the motions. The adversarial system is tasked with 
dealing with the weak claims and motions. Lawyers, representing their 
clients vigorously, are permitted to file weak claims and weak motions. 
The system then offers means for the claims and motions to be dismissed. 
As in organized sports such as football, rules are established subject to 
which the participants are permitted to try their hardest—to represent their 
clients vigorously.187 
Except for in the area of discovery, adversarial, self-interested 
litigation effort is assumed to produce a good outcome. The litigants’ 
butting heads in self-interested combat will produce efficient justice. This 
is the whole basis of the U.S. adversarial system.188 Lawyers’ vigorous 
representation of their clients, within the rules, is to be encouraged, 
because it will lead to a just efficient outcome. 
Discovery is different. The rules permit the various discovery 
devices, but then they exhort the litigants to restrain themselves in using 
them. For example, even if a discovery device would otherwise be 
185.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
186.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, Part II(A) (1986). 
187.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND SCOPE (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) 
(“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary 
system.”).   
 188.  See Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of Seeking 
Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147 (2002).  
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allowed in a case, the device is discouraged unless it is “proportional,” or 
if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.”189 In addition, in deciding whether to use a discovery device, the 
litigant is asked to consider “the parties’ resources.”190 Apparently, the 
rules would smile on a litigant conducting a given discovery method 
against a wealthy adversary, but would discourage the litigant from using 
exactly the same method in exactly the same case, except that the 
adversary was less wealthy. 
That is, unlike in the rest of the litigation process, litigants 
conducting discovery are asked not to litigate with full vigor. The litigant 
cannot merely use discovery vigorously, as long as specific rules for 
specific discovery devices are obeyed. Instead, the litigant is asked to 
consider factors other than their client’s interests. It is like a football 
player being asked not to try their hardest, to not tackle hard in an 
unimportant game, or in a game where the opponent has a lower budget 
to pay their players. 
Discovery is inconsistent with the normal adversarial process. In 
areas other than discovery, litigants are permitted and encouraged to 
litigate vigorously. Indeed, a lawyer may have an ethical duty to represent 
her client with vigor; a lawyer who did not represent her client vigorously 
would be shirking her duty to her client. However, in discovery, the 
normal vigor is forbidden. In this one area, lawyers are expected to 
consider factors other than their client’s interests. 
The conflict between lawyer’s instinct to vigorously represent her 
client and the rules’ requirement that the lawyer ignore their client’s 
interests and do only “proportionate” discovery leads to inconsistent 
amounts of discovery even in cases with similar characteristics. In some 
cases, lawyers give in to their traditional instincts to consider only their 
client’s interests in deciding their amount of discovery; they do a large 
amount of discovery if it benefits their clients. In other cases, the lawyers 
observe the proportionality guidance, doing less discovery than the 
amount that would maximize benefit to their clients. 
This outcome is harmful for three reasons. First, like cases are not 
litigated similarly. In some cases, much discovery occurs. In other similar 
cases, little does. Litigation expense is high in some cases, but low in other 
similar cases.191 Because the amount of discovery can alter a case’s 
outcome, outcomes will be different even in identical cases. 
189.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
190.  Id. 
191.  See Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8, at 126. 
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Second, the outcome is harmful because it creates stressful internal 
conflicts for lawyers. The rules require the lawyer to pursue two 
objectives simultaneously: choose the discovery amount that allows the 
attorney to represent her client with utmost vigor and choose a discovery 
amount that is “proportional.” These two objectives conflict, stressing the 
lawyer; attempting to serve two masters’ conflicting directives causes 
anxiety. 
Asking a lawyer both to represent their client with vigor and also 
conduct only proportional and restrained discovery is against human 
nature. It is like sending a warrior into battle with a savage weapon, but 
then requiring them to be gentle in using it. 
Third, the system causes conflict and suspicion among lawyers. 
Lawyers who focus on the proportionality objective resent lawyers who 
ignore proportionality and instead focus on vigorously representing their 
clients. The lawyers who focus on proportionality view those who do not 
as gaining an unfair advantage. They view the other lawyers the same way 
a drug-free professional bicyclist would view other bicyclists who use 
performance-enhancing drugs. 
H. Discovery Violates Norms of Privacy 
Broad discovery violates norms of privacy. Before 1938, a societal 
expectation existed that things said or written in privacy would remain 
private.192 It is human nature to demand a zone of privacy. Indeed, the 
U.S. Constitution enshrines privacy as a fundamental right.193 People in 
the United States expect privacy, especially from intrusions by their 
government. Indeed, outside of the discovery process, the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution have been interpreted as 
creating certain rights to privacy. The government may not intrude into a 
citizen’s private decisions about contraception, abortion, or homosexual 
sex.194 
The normal right to privacy that U.S. citizens enjoy does not exist 
during the litigation process. The FRCP permit a government agency—
the courts—and a government official—the judge—to intrude into a 
citizen’s most private matters, merely because the citizen has sued or been 
192.  See generally Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970). 
 193.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
194.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which all interpret the 14th Amendment to create a right to 
privacy surrounding these activities. 
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sued. In effect, the rules indicate that, by being involved in a lawsuit, the 
parties forfeit their privacy rights. 
This forfeiture is broad. The scope of discovery is immense. The 
adversary can obtain from the party any relevant information that is not 
privileged and not work product.195 Relevance is interpreted broadly to 
include any material that could matter at all to the litigation, even just a 
tiny bit.196 
Likewise, privileges apply only to small categories of 
communications, such as those between lawyer and client. Moreover, 
privileges are interpreted narrowly.197 
Accordingly, the courts routinely allow deeply intrusive discovery, 
violating the deeply-held privacy norm. The adversary can require the 
litigant to provide stunningly personal and private information. Many 
private discussions and written communications are unprivileged and 
discoverable.198 For example, those who have not become deadened to the 
system may often be shocked that a litigant may obtain copies of almost 
all of a corporation’s private emails.199 In the Microsoft antitrust case, the 
government’s most powerful evidence was informal internal emails 
between Microsoft’s top leadership.200 Likewise discoverable—for 
example in a divorce proceeding—are the contents of an individual’s 
computer, including the embarrassing websites that the person has visited 
and love letters that the person has received.201 
The adversary is even allowed to intrude into the litigant’s bedroom, 
with the litigant sometimes being required to disclose intimate details of 
their sexual practices. For example, in cases where women have alleged 
that they were injured and rendered infertile by dangerous morning-
sickness drugs or defective birth control devices, defendants have been 
permitted to compel the plaintiffs to reveal the identities of all of their 
prior sexual partners, and whether the sexual partners had sexually-
transmitted diseases.202 
195.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 196.  See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”). 
197.  See, e.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990). 
198.  See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, Co., 253 F.3d 34, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
199.  Id. 
200.  Id. 
201.  See, e.g., Byrne v. Byrne, 650 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (App. Div. 1996). 
202.  Richard Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457 
(1991). 
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So, we have seen that, by being involved in a lawsuit, the litigants 
forfeit their rights to privacy. This is not a voluntary waiver. Instead, this 
is an involuntary forfeiture. It is easy to see that forfeiture is involuntary 
for the defendant. The defendant is a party to the litigation against her 
will: she is a party only because the plaintiff sued her. 
Similarly, the plaintiff’s waiver is effectively involuntary. The 
plaintiff/victim must sue the defendant only because the defendant injured 
her, whether through tort or breach of contract. However, the defendant’s 
act of injuring the victim was beyond the plaintiff’s control; the victim did 
not ask to be injured. The victim is forced to sue only because of what the 
defendant did, which is beyond the victim’s control. Both the plaintiff and 
the defendant are parties only because of the other’s independent conduct. 
The defendant is a party because the plaintiff sued the defendant. The 
plaintiff is a party because the defendant injured the plaintiff. Nonetheless, 
their participation in the lawsuit, although involuntary, forfeits their 
normal rights to privacy. 
People from other countries are shocked at U.S. discovery’s 
intrusiveness. People with whom this author has spoken who lived in 
former East Germany remember vividly the deadening horror of the fear 
that the secret police were monitoring their private lives. They view 
discovery’s intrusiveness as similar. Both the secret police in former East 
Germany and courts in the United States have invaded citizens’ most 
private domains. People in Europe remember too well the degree to which 
the Nazi government controlled the population in part by reaching deeply 
into people’s private lives. Indeed, for oppressive governments, 
knowledge of people’s private information is often power. 
In many other countries, recent history offers dramatic examples of 
horrid leaders preserving power by violating privacy. That is one 
important reason why almost all other countries have rejected the U.S. 
system of broad discovery.203 Government spying by discovery resembles 
too closely other sinister forms of government spying. 
Something important is lost when private individuals may not 
communicate in private without the constant threat that government 
agents—and that is what the courts are—will listen in. If everyone were 
not so accustomed to discovery’s intrusiveness, everyone would see more 
clearly that the discovery process brings the United States frighteningly 
203.  See infra Section III. 
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close to the world in George Orwell’s 1984.204 Only here, Big Brother is 
a court enforcing an order compelling discovery.205 
The United States is alone in allowing the courts to intrude in this 
way into privacy.206 For example, European legal systems are motivated 
much more deeply by an underlying expectation of the privacy of both 
personal and business information.207 
The dissonance between citizens’ expectations of privacy and the 
discovery process’s violations of these privacy norms lead to many of the 
discovery system’s troubles. Because broad discovery grinds against 
human nature, litigants who receive discovery requests often resist them 
compulsively. This leads to endless cycles of evasions and motions to 
compel. Broad discovery is like 1920s prohibition. Citizens tend to like 
both privacy and alcohol. Any attempt to intrude on either privacy or 
drinking leads to resistance and unhappiness. Because it violated 
ingrained human preferences, prohibition was a failure. Likewise, broad 
discovery is a failure because it violates important privacy norms. 
III. ENDING THE FAILED EXPERIMENT
As discussed in this Article, broad discovery has inflicted substantial 
injuries on society and the legal profession, with very few benefits. The 
cure is clear: remove the discovery cancer.208 
The world would be a better place without broad discovery. Indeed, 
the absence of broad discovery has already improved conditions in all 
other parts of the world except the United States; wide-open discovery 
exists only here.209 The United States should respect the combined and 
consistent judgment of every other country that broad discovery is bad 
policy. Confronted with strong evidence of discovery’s harms, the United 
States should cease asserting that it knows better than everyone else. 
Although it would be best to eliminate U.S.-style broad discovery, 
strictly-limited discovery might appropriately remain available in 
exceptional circumstances. For example, the United States might model 
reforms on the present systems in Britain, Europe, or Japan.210 In these 
204.  GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic Pub. 1949).  
205.  See generally id.  
206.  See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 19, at 193. 
207.  Id. at 193-94. 
208.  A brief earlier essay also called for elimination of broad discovery. Kieve, supra note 151. 
Other scholars have contrasted the U.S. discovery process with that in other countries, but not called 
for its elimination. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 160. 
209.  See Marcus, supra note 19, at 154-55. 
 210.  For a description of these systems, see generally Burkhard Bastuck & Burkard Gopfert, 
Admission and Presentation of Evidence in Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 609 (1994); 
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systems, litigants may sometimes obtain limited discovery after 
convincing a judge of exceptional need.211 Often, discovery that takes 
place is conducted by the judge, not by the litigants.212 The modest 
variations in the world’s countries with limited discovery provide a 
perfect natural experiment for selecting the best approach. 
Recommending the details of the best new system is a topic for future 
research. 
One might fear that individual plaintiffs suing large organizations 
would be unable to obtain the secret internal documents that would be 
necessary to prove liability. However, in general, broad discovery harms 
the individual litigant rather than helping him. As already discussed, cases 
where discovery produces a smoking gun are rare. It is probable that more 
often, discovery is now used as a weapon by the large organizations to 
gain unfair advantage over the individual litigant. 
Moreover, the problem of secret internal documents may be reduced, 
if not eliminated, by altering burdens of proof. For example, Germany and 
many other countries impose strict liability on defendants in most product 
liability suits.213 In suits where a negligence rule still applies, many 
countries’ courts do not require the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s 
negligence.214 Instead, they shift the burden of proof to the defendant to 
rebut a presumption of fault.215 Unless the defendant successfully carries 
the burden, the plaintiff wins the suit, but without requiring discovery.216 
Moreover, in these other systems, there is no opportunity for the defendant 
to use discovery to intimidate. 
Burdens could be shifted similarly in other areas in which defendants 
might have sole access to important evidence. For example, in a suit for 
fraud against a large organization, the U.S. system requires the plaintiff to 
produce evidence that the defendant knew of a statement’s falsity. Before 
Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff could attempt to obtain such information 
through discovery of the defendant’s internal documents. An alternative 
would be to shift the burden of proof: once the plaintiff proves falsity, the 
Benjamin Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1958); John 
H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985); Marcus, 
supra note 19; Itsuko Mori, The Difference Between U.S. Discovery and Japanese Taking of Evidence, 
23 INT’L LAW. 3 (1989); Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A comparison of Japanese 
and U.S. Methods of Evidence Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2002). 
211.  See generally sources cited supra note 206. 
212.  See generally sources cited supra note 206. 
213.  See Reimann, supra note 14, at 764; Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of Product 
Liability Law in the European Community, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 21, 25-27 (1999). 
214.  See Reimann, supra note 14, at 790-91; Taschner, supra note 213, at 27-28. 
215.  See Reimann, supra note 14, at 790-91; Taschner, supra note 213, at 27-28. 
216.  See Reimann, supra note 14, at 790-91; Taschner, supra note 213, at 27-28. 
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defendant would have the burden to prove the absence of knowledge of 
falsity. 
One need not speculate about whether eliminating broad discovery 
would function well. The system proposed in this Article already works 
well in scores of other countries. As Professor Subrin has noted about 
many U.S. commentators’ skepticism about various aspects of the U.S. 
discovery system, “[t]his skepticism has to be heightened when one looks 
at civil discovery in the rest of the world, where civilizations seemed to 
have survived quite well without American discovery.”217 
Indeed, admittedly inexact bottom-line indicators of legal systems’ 
relative effectiveness suggest that systems without broad discovery 
perform no worse than, and perhaps better than, the U.S. system. For 
example, one important underlying goal of a liability system is to deter 
injurious conduct.218 Even without broad discovery, the German system 
appears to compare favorably with the U.S. system. The automobile 
accidental death rate in Germany is less than half the U.S. rate.219 
Although this data ignores other important influences on death rates, it 
suggests that the absence of broad discovery in Germany is not inducing 
Germans and German automobile manufacturers to run amok in creating 
dangerous automobiles. 
As discussed elsewhere, the elimination of broad discovery would 
also permit many clients and lawyers to abandon both hourly billing and 
to avoid all of the problems that it causes.220 
Elimination of broad discovery might require modest changes in 
other parts of the legal system. As others have noted, other parts of the 
system are premised on the existence of broad discovery.221 For example, 
because the U.S. system of notice pleading often requires little detail in 
plaintiffs’ complaints, an important means for defendants to learn of 
plaintiffs’ specific assertions is through discovery. Thus, the elimination 
of discovery might need to be accompanied by a requirement of greater 
specificity in pleadings. This would not be a new or unfamiliar 
requirement. Instead it would merely extend to all cases the present 
217.  Subrin, supra note 160, at 301. 
218.  See generally Taschner, supra note 213. 
219.  Road Traffic Deaths Data by Country, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.A997?lang=en [https://perma.cc/K8ZG-WYP3] (last visited 
on Mar. 6, 2018). 
220.  Shepherd & Cloud, supra note 8. 
 221.  See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 19, at 156; Subrin, supra note 160, at 308-10; see generally 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1017 (1998). 
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requirements of FRCP 9(b) that fraud be pled with particularity.222 
Twombly and Iqbal are already nudging the litigation system in this 
direction.223 
One might also need to hire more judges. A possible objection to 
eliminating broad discovery is that it would place excessive reliance on 
judges to gather information—if rules were also changed to permit judges, 
instead of litigants, to conduct more fact-finding, as in many legal 
European systems.224 Unlike European judges, the argument goes, U.S. 
judges are unaccustomed and unfit to administer the gathering of 
information.225 Moreover, they are often already overwhelmed by heavy 
caseloads, especially their criminal dockets.226 
This problem might be solved by hiring more judges. However, even 
if the United States hired no new judges and the existing judges remained 
resistant to administering discovery closely, the system would merely 
suffer from many of the same problems as European courts. European 
judges also tend to be lazy in their fact gathering.227 Instead, European 
courts demonstrate “a considerable degree of tolerance—almost 
insouciance, to common law eyes—for the incompleteness of evidentiary 
material.”228 
Instead, European systems rely on litigants to assemble their own 
information from their own sources, rather than relying on the adversary 
for information.229 In situations where only the adversary often has 
information, the systems tend to shift the burden to the adversary, rather 
than requiring the adversary to produce information.230 
A final impact of the elimination of broad discovery would be that 
many litigators would lose their jobs. The cuts would be especially great 
in big firms, where the cases that spawn profuse discovery are litigated. 
It is possible that this may already be happening after Twombly and 
Iqbal. The two decisions have inevitably caused some cases to be 
dismissed and others not to be filed in the first place. Both developments 
reduce the need for plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense lawyers. It may be that 
the reduction in legal employment over recent years was due not only to 
222.  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
223.  See supra Section II(D). 
224.  See generally sources cited supra note 206. 
225.  Hazard, supra note 221, at 1021-22. 
226.  See Marcus, supra note 19, at 187. 
227.  See id. at 193. 
228.  Id. (citing Mirjan R. Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-
American and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 843 (1997)). 
229.  See generally Subrin, supra note 160. 
230.  See generally id. 
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the general recession that the economy suffered. In addition, Twombly and 
Iqbal may have contributed to the decline in employment for both 
plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers by reducing both the number of cases that 
are filed and the amount of discovery that is conducted. 
The reduction in employment would be a good development. Some 
of society’s smartest, hardest-working people would switch from lives 
devoted to counterproductive, wasteful discovery to other productive, 
helpful careers. That the legal profession in many other countries is 
smaller helps, not harms, these countries. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The provisions for broad discovery in the FRCP have failed since 
they were adopted in 1938. The system began to fail from the beginning 
and has continued to fail. It has dramatically increased litigation’s cost 
and pain, with few balancing benefits. 
Broad discovery should be eliminated, returning the United States to 
the sensible approach of the rest of the world. The Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal correctly focus on the dangers of 
discovery abuse and they appropriately require dismissal of some cases 
that would otherwise become fishing expeditions.231 The 2015 FRCP 
amendments are ineffectual tinkering. Reform beyond this is needed. 
Broad discovery should be completely eliminated. 
 231.  See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009). 
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